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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the idea of a "naïve physics" in 
humans solving physics problems. This invokes the idea that 
people have a theory of motion in their heads that is non-
Newtonian, and hence leads to systematic errors on these 
problems. We are able to show that, by selecting our 
problems carefully, it is possible to obtain answers that are 
consistent with this naïve physics and inconsistent with it; 
suggesting that it is not used to solve these problems but 
sometimes offered as post-hoc justification for the answers 
given. We offer evidence that the answers given owe more to 
past experience than any theory, and that a theory that 
postulates extrapolation on the basis of associative memory 
can give a good account of our results. 
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Introduction 
McCloskey, Caramazza and Green (1980) and 
McCloskey, Washburn and Felch (1983) have proposed that 
people consistently make particular mistakes when asked to 
predict the path of an object, given certain initial conditions, 
because they are applying the wrong theory, an intuitive 
mechanics or "naïve physics", to this type of problem. Their 
evidence is that, when given a relatively simple physical 
situation and asked to extrapolate on the basis of the 
information supplied, people tend to make certain types of 
error rather than others, and justify this with verbal reports 
that indicate a non-Newtonian approach to the problem 
(even though the instructions encourage that type of 
approach). One example of such a problem would be for 
participants to be asked to imagine looking down on the 
curved tube (which is held horizontally) in Figure 1, while a 
ball bearing is inserted with some speed, v, as shown. Their 
task is to draw the path the ball bearing takes on exiting the 
tube, ignoring such factors as friction between ball bearing 
and tube, and any wind resistance. The plan view is 
intended to take gravity out of the picture for the purposes 
of this problem, and the correct, Newtonian solution, is to 
draw a straight line as shown in the figure (solid line) as the 
ball bearing leaves the tube. Instead, many participants draw 
something approximating the curved dotted line as their 
answer, and justify this by claiming that the ball bearing has 
acquired "curvy impetus" as a result of its journey through 
the tube and this continues to cause its path to curve on 
exiting the tube. A more sophisticated version of this 
account will claim that this impetus dissipates with time, 
and so the curved path will gradually straighten as the ball 
bearing gets further from the tube (see McCloskey et al, 
1980). 
 
 
Figure 1: The ball bearing and curved tube problem. 
 
Another classic problem studied by McCloskey and 
colleagues concerns what they call the "straight down 
belief" (McCloskey, Washburn & Felch 1983). The idea 
here is that people tend to predict a straight down trajectory 
for objects that are dropped whilst being carried, whereas 
they predict a parabolic path for objects that fall when 
moving independently. A classic example of this is a 
cannonball projected off a cliff. If fired horizontally from a 
cannon with initial velocity, v, an "out and down" 
approximation to the parabolic path is a typical response 
from participants asked to draw its subsequent path. But if 
carried (by some overhead conveyor belt arrangement) to 
the edge of the cliff with velocity, v, and then released, even 
though this is the identical problem in physical terms, 
participants are much more likely to describe the 
cannonball's motion as straight down. The reason they give 
for this is that, in the first case, the cannonball possesses its 
own impetus when it leaves the gun. This horizontal 
impetus takes it out past the cliff edge, but starts to 
dissipate. At the same time, gravity takes hold, and 
accelerates it downwards – hence the "out and down" 
parabolic trajectory. But, in the case of the cannonball being 
carried by a conveyor belt, participants think it has no 
impetus of its own, and so, when released, gravity takes 
hold immediately and it drops straight down. 
 
The research reported in McCloskey et al’s paper 
investigates the basis for this finding. On the one hand, it 
may be just as it seems and as participants in these 
experiments claim, i.e. that they have applied a naïve 
physics (or natural intuition) to the problem which is, in 
some sense the "wrong" theory as it is non-Newtonian, and 
it is this that leads to the consistent error in predicting the 
path of the object. On the other hand, it may be that the 
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account given by participants of why they drew that 
particular path is more by way of a post-hoc rationalization 
of what they did, rather than an account of what caused 
them to do it. Instead, the causal factor in producing this 
consistent error could be extrapolation on the basis of 
experience, by which we mean to imply associatively-
mediated retrieval of memories based on some surface 
similarity to the problem just posed. On this account, the 
reason why a carried object is often portrayed as taking a 
path straight downwards when released is because that is the 
perceived experience that we have, and call upon, of this 
situation in real life. Imagine you are cycling along and you 
drop a package. To a first approximation at least, the 
package appears to fall straight down. This is because both 
the package and the observer on the bicycle share a 
(moving) frame of reference, and in that frame of reference 
there is no horizontal motion with respect to one another. 
But a thrown package, which, in naïve physics terms, is one 
moving independently, does not have this property and so 
will follow a curved trajectory. 
 
We realize that proponents of the naïve physics view will 
argue that it is exactly episodes of this kind that lead to 
induction of a naïve physics i.e. the incorrect theory is 
derived from these types of experiences, and it is only by 
running carefully controlled experiments that allow for 
friction, wind resistance, and frames of reference that the 
proper Newtonian theory can be arrived at. But we would 
differ from this view in arguing that the effect of experience 
is primary, and that its impact via retrieval from memory is 
what drives the response, not its impact via some naïve 
physics induced on the basis of these experiences. This 
stance makes the prediction that, if we are able to find 
scenarios where experience would predict that a carried 
object would follow a curved trajectory, or an object 
moving independently should take a path straight down, 
then the result of putting these problems to participants 
should be quite different to that predicted on the naïve 
physics account. If participants have a theory that drives 
their responses, then it should apply across different 
situations, as long as the particular scenario employed does 
not change the essential physics of the problem. Equally, if 
the outcome of experimental investigation of this 
proposition were to be that the responses made to a problem 
involving a carried object were to predict a path straight 
down (independent of considerable variation in the surface 
features of the scenario), then this would be inconsistent 
with an account in terms of associative memory (to the 
extent that different memories would be expected to lead to 
different predictions. 
 
Experiment  
Method 
Participants 
27 University of Exeter students with ages ranging from 
18-35 participated in this experiment. All were 
undergraduates studying psychology, but were naïve to the 
hypotheses under test in this experiment. ! !
Design 
Eight physics problems, featuring falling objects, were 
devised. These problems all had the same underlying 
structure, and therefore the same answer (in terms of 
Newtonian physics), but different surface and contextual 
features.  The problems were of two types: Those in which 
the object was carried prior to being released, and those 
where the object had been moving freely (independently) 
throughout.  These two problem types were further divided 
to give two subsets in which the expected answers were 
either congruent or incongruent with the predictions of a 
naïve physics theory.   
 
Four different types of problems were, therefore, 
presented to the participants in a questionnaire: 
 
Type 1: Carried – Congruent (CC) – Problems in which 
objects are carried prior to release and where our predicted 
answer “falls straight down” is in accordance with naïve 
physics theory. 
Type 2: Carried – Incongruent (CI) – Problems in which 
objects are carried prior to release and where our predicted 
answer is not in accordance with naïve physics theory. 
Type 3: Free – Congruent (FC) – Problems in which 
objects are moving freely/independently and where our 
predicted answer “curved forwards/parabolic trajectory” is 
in accordance with naïve physics theory. 
Type 4: Free – Incongruent (FI) – Problems in which 
objects are moving freely/independently and where our 
predicted answer is not in accordance with naïve physics 
theory. 
Two imaginary scenarios were devised for each type of 
problem. These were constructed using MS Powerpoint and 
Word software on a Macintosh computer as follows: 
 
Table 1 
 
1. Carried Congruent condition (CC): 
Problem 1. Bird in flight dropping ice cream 
Problem 5. Plane dropping crate 
 
2. Carried Incongruent condition (CI): 
Problem 2. Swinging monkey drops banana 
Problem 6. Cricket bowler drops ball at release 
 
3. Free Congruent condition (FC): 
Problem  3. Cannonball fired off cliff 
Problem 7. Skier approaching a crevasse 
 
4. Free Incongruent condition (FI): 
Problem 4. Skateboarder dropping in to a half-pipe 
Problem 8. Water falling over a cliff  
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Figure 2. The figure shows one of the scenarios (Problem 1) 
presented for the CC condition.  Participants were asked to 
select one of the 5 responses to indicate the trajectory of the 
dropped object (e.g. the ice-cream) 
 
The problems in Table 1 were chosen so that the CC and 
FC examples, i.e. the congruent problems, were closely 
modeled on problems that have typically been used in 
previous experiments on naïve physics. As far as we could 
tell, there were no associations to events or situations that 
contradicted the predictions of a naïve physics theory for 
these examples. The incongruent problems (CI and FI) were 
chosen so that they conformed to the “Carried” or “Free” 
designation, but had associations that seemed to us to 
suggest that a response that was incongruent with a naïve 
physics theory would be given. Thus, a cricket bowler (e.g. 
Problem 6) is typically seen as projecting the ball forwards, 
not dropping it straight down. If you observe someone or 
something else (e.g. the monkey in Problem 2) in a state of 
motion carrying an object that they drop, then the typical 
perceived experience is for that object to continue to follow 
that state of motion. Because waterfalls (e.g. Problem 8) are 
typically seen from front-on and below, the modal 
experience is of them falling nearly straight down; and when  
 
Figure 3. This shows examples of the other three types of 
scenario presented to our participants. The top panel is an 
example of a CI (Type 2 problem), the middle a FC (Type 3 
problem) and the bottom a FI (Type 4 problem) example. In 
each case the same five response options were offered, 
illustrated by mini-drawings to show the path suggested (see 
Figure 2 for examples). 
 
skateboarders drop in (e.g. Problem 4), they typically appear 
to take an initial path that is straight down. So, our hope was 
that these scenarios would predispose our participants to 
choose paths that were not expected on a naïve physics 
account. 
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Procedure 
The eight problems were collated into a nine page A4 
sized booklet printed in black and white using size 12 Arial 
font.  The front page consisted of instructions to the 
participants, a consent form and a question asking for 
information about their level of physics knowledge.  Each of 
the following eight pages featured one of the physics 
problems, a pictorial multiple-choice selection showing the 
available answers and a text box with space for participants 
to write an explanation of the rationale behind their 
selection. The presentation of the problems was randomized, 
with each problem appearing once, and equally likely to 
appear on any page. 
 
Participants were asked to look at each problem and 
attempt to predict the path of the object as it fell to the 
ground.  They were then asked to select, by circling the 
relevant number from the multiple choice answers, which of 
the five responses:  1. Backwards, 2. Straight Down, 3. Out 
& Down, 4. Curved forwards (Parabolic) and 5. Straight 
Forwards, most closely resembled the path they had thought 
of. Participants were also asked to write a short rationale for 
their choice of path to make clear the connection between 
their answer and their intuition.  After completing all 
problems participants returned the booklet and were thanked 
for their contribution.   
 
Results 
The data of interest are the frequencies of each response 
(1-5) provided for a given problem. Table 2 gives these 
frequencies for each problem. The responses that might be 
considered consistent with naïve physics (NP) for a given 
problem are shown in green, those that are not and are better 
explained by an appeal to associative memory (AM) are 
shown in red.  
Table 2 
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We took the view that for a “Carried” problem (Problems 
1, 5, 2 and 6) the NP congruent response would be 2 
(“Straight Down”) and the AM (or NP Incongruent) 
response would be 3 (“Out & Down”) or 4 (“Curved 
Forwards”). For a “Free” problem (Problems 3, 7, 4 and 8) 
the NP responses we allowed as congruent were either 3 
(“Out & Down”) or 4 (“Curved Forwards”).  This was done 
because, in practice, distinguishing between responses 3 and 
4 was difficult. The AM (or Incongruent) equivalent 
response for these problems was 2 (“Straight Down”). 
Responses 1 and 5 were relatively rarely used, so when 
computing Chi-Square values we collapsed responses 1 and 
2 together, and responses 3, 4 and 5 together. This gave two 
basic classes of answer, which we can characterise as 
mostly straight down and certainly not forwards (1 and 2), 
and mostly curved forwards (3, 4 and 5).  
 
We first of all collapsed over the two problems per 
condition, and then ran a !2 as a 4 x 5 contingency table (4 
conditions by 5 responses) to see if there was any effect of 
condition on responding. The resultant !2=157, 12df, 
p<.005 suggests that there is. We then collapsed further so 
that there were only two response classes as already detailed 
(to ensure that the expected values in each cell were 
sufficiently high), and carried out a series of !2 analyses to 
investigate the basis of this effect. A 2 x 2 contingency table 
(hence, 1df) analysis of congruency by response gave a 
!2=0.95, p=ns, indicating no main effect of this factor. 
Analysis of “Free” vs. “Carried” by response gave a 
!2=26.13, p<.001, showing that this factor exerted a strong 
influence over choice of response, with, as expected, “Free” 
problems tending to produce mostly curved forwards 
responses and “Carried” problems mostly straight down 
responses. If we break this down further, then the !2=3.06, 
p=ns for the Incongruent data suggested that there was no 
significant difference in the distribution of responses caused 
by this factor in these problems, but the !2=78.06, p<.001 
for the Congruent data indicates that it is these problems 
that drove the strong tendency for the two types of problem 
to lead to different responses. 
 
The data of main interest, however, are how the 
Congruency factor influences performance on the “Free” 
and “Carried” problems. Taking the “Free” problems first, a 
2 x 2 contingency table analysis with congruency as a 
factor, and collapsed response as the other, produced a 
!2=28.66, p<.001, with Congruent problems favouring a 
curved forwards response over straight down answers, and 
Incongruent problems significantly reducing this tendency. 
The “Carried” data show an even clearer effect, with 
Congruent problems favouring straight down responses and 
Incongruent data reversing this effect to show a strong 
tendency to elicit curved forwards responses, !2 =34.09, 
p<.001. It seems that we were successful in our attempt to 
select problems that either favoured the response expected 
on the basis of naïve physics (Congruent), or were not 
congruent with this prediction and instead owed more to 
associative memory (Incongruent). This effect was 
particularly marked for the “Carried” problems, where there 
is essentially a pure interaction, with the Congruent 
problems behaving exactly as naïve physics would predict 
and the Incongruent problems showing quite the opposite 
pattern. The results corresponding to these analyses are 
shown in an easily interpretable form in Figure 4. 
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 Figure 4. This shows the response difference score for each of 
the four conditions in our experiment. This score is simply the 
difference between the aggregated responses, (3+4+5)-(1+2), 
and measures preference for one response class over the 
other, with a positive score denoting a bias in favor of the 
curved forwards class over the straight down alternative. 
 
In essence, Figure 4 demonstrates that whilst it is entirely 
possible to get the pattern of results predicted by a naïve 
physics model for how people solve this type of problem, it 
is also possible to choose problems such that the effect is 
eliminated.  
 
General Discussion 
What are we to conclude from these findings? Perhaps the 
first, and most obvious conclusion, is that a simple naïve 
physics theory that predicts the "straight down effect" 
because carried objects do not have any impetus of their 
own is not going to be able to explain these results. Either 
the theory is wrong, or it is not being applied in these 
situations. And this last is a real possibility. By giving 
considerable context to the problems, we have definitely 
biased participants in the way that they approach them, 
perhaps they do not invoke a naïve physics in these 
circumstances because the problems are not abstract 
enough? 
 
 Our objection to this analysis would be that naïve physics 
is exactly that which should be able to deal with these "real 
world" situations. And furthermore, there is as good 
qualitative evidence for naïve physics being used in our 
experiment as there is in other studies that have used this 
evidence to argue for a naïve physics theory. If we take the 
CC class of problem first, we have the following quotes that 
are typical of the approach taken to these problems by our 
participants.  
For Problem 1: “As soon as the seagull lets go there is no 
forward momentum, so therefore it will drop straight 
down.” 
And for Problem 5: “The box dropped straight out of the 
plane so would not have been affected by the movement of 
the plane.” 
Both these problems are Carried Congruent scenarios. The 
typical response selection was No. 2, "straight down", and 
the explanation offered is the classic "an object has no 
impetus of its own if carried" justification given on the basis 
of a naïve physics. But if we now consider the explanations 
given for the Carried Incongruent problems we have for 
Problem 6: “From my experience of ball games, they don’t 
just drop downwards.”  
Which clearly indicates a reliance on experience that we 
take to be mediated by associative memory. It might be 
argued that the memory simply overrides the predictions of 
the theory in this instance, and of course this is a possible 
explanation of the forward path typically chosen for this 
problem. But when we come to Problem 4, one of the Free 
Incongruent scenarios, then the justification offered for 
choosing the straight down response (No. 2) is in Problem 
4: “That’s how skaters do it.” 
So we would have to argue that once again recall based on 
experience is overriding the predictions of the theory (which 
would predict that the path is curved forwards). At this point 
the reader will notice that in every case the answer chosen is 
one consistent with generic experience of the world, and this 
impression is confirmed by our final class of problem, Free 
Congruent, where the typical response is curved forwards as 
a naïve physics would predict, and the generic explanation 
for offering this response is in Problem 7: 
“Due to moving at speed.”   
Which fits nicely with the idea that a freely moving object 
has impetus. Thus we have two conditions where we have 
the results and the rationale expected on a naïve physics 
view, and two conditions where we have the opposite. But 
in all cases, the responses and rationale seem grounded in 
experience, and an explanation based on extrapolation from 
experience is tenable. Surely in these circumstances it is 
more parsimonious to attribute the answers given to 
memory-based extrapolation from experience, rather than 
invoke some abstracted theory that has to be overridden 
much of the time? 
 
But we do not think that just any memory-based 
extrapolation from experience will serve to explain our 
results. Instead, we believe that the memory involved is 
associative in nature, so that it has captured the basic 
statistical regularities embedded in experience and retrieves 
them on the basis of a surface similarity to the problem. As 
such, we believe that an error-correcting system (e.g. 
McClelland and Rumelhart, 1985, Rumelhart, Hinton and 
Williams, 1986, and see McLaren and Dickinson, 1990 for a 
discussion) is required, as this will be able to extract the 
necessary structure. A version of such a system that can then 
function as a model of associative memory would be ideal 
(e.g. see the model in McLaren, 2011, based on McLaren, 
1993, and the most recent version of this in McLaren, 
Forrest and McLaren, 2012). Finally, the ability to capture 
structure over time will also be needed, and for this the SRN 
(Elman, 1990) and it's more sophisticated variant the 
Augmented SRN (Cleeremans and McClelland, 1991, see 
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also Yeates, Jones, Wills, McLaren and McLaren, in press, 
and the APECS variant in Jones and McLaren, 2001) fits the 
bill.  
 
This more primitive, associative system is only part of the 
story, however, we also postulate another rule-based system 
that takes the output of associative memory and then 
constructs a story about the answer given around it. In doing 
this we are advocating a dual-process theory of cognition 
along the lines of that given in McLaren, Green and 
Mackintosh (1994), and illustrated in Spiegel and McLaren 
(2003, 2006) and Jones and McLaren (2009). It is this 
combination of extrapolation based on experience, followed 
by induction of some heuristic to explain why a particular 
answer has been given, that we believe has led to the notion 
of a naïve physics. It results in reliably incorrect answers to 
physics problems, and a narrative that accompanies these 
answers. The point of our research, however, is to show that 
if we frame what is essentially the same problem in a 
different way, so that we access a different type of 
experience, then the answer changes and so does the 
accompanying narrative. Clearly, if a deeper physical 
analysis of the problems were involved in accessing 
experience, the answer to all the problems studied here 
would be the same, a parabolic path forwards. Hence we 
have to postulate retrieval on the basis of surface similarity 
for this aspect of our theory to work. We would then argue 
that actually the inductive inference that suggests a naïve 
physics is more a matter of an attempt to "make sense" of 
our participants intuitive response to these scenarios. 
  
Conclusion 
We have arrived at a position where the statements made 
by participants attempting to solve simple physics problems 
and taken to support the existence of a naïve physics are 
seen as post-hoc rationalization for the answer given rather 
than causally implicated in that answer. We believe that it is 
extrapolation based on experience, via retrieval from 
associative memory (that is itself the product of associative 
learning), which is responsible for the reliably incorrect 
answers given to the problems studied here. We would go 
further, and say that our position also applies to the more 
abstract problems often studied in naïve physics 
experiments, though clearly here the experiential memories 
involved must be of a more generic nature. Take as an 
example the problem shown in Figure 1. How are we to 
explain that result? What memory could be accessed for that 
problem? There are not many retrieval cues, just a curved 
tube and a ball bearing. But this is enough to retrieve 
memories of water emerging from a garden hose (as these 
are often curved) – and the path the water takes is typically 
curved as well. The analogy between hose and problem is, 
of course, incorrect – but the superficial similarity exists and 
this is what drives associative processing. The result is an 
extrapolation to an incorrect, curved path, because it feels 
right. And then we tell a story about why we gave that 
answer. The great advantage of this explanation is that it 
generalizes to the results reported in this paper. And so we 
conclude that as a theory of why we seem to have the wrong 
idea about how objects move, it is to be preferred to the 
naïve physics point of view. 
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